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Abstract 
This study seeks to examine the performance differences between regulated and unregulated 
investment funds. The funds studied are called alternative mutual funds by federal regulators, 
and are different than traditional mutual funds. Sponsors of these alternative mutual funds 
have increased their offerings to the investing public which has attracted regulators’ attention. 
Regulators are assessing whether the current regulatory framework is sufficient for protecting 
investors. The objective of this empirical analysis is to determine the effect of regulations on 
the performance of these alternative mutual funds relative to unregulated funds of similar 
character. This type of study is a first step in examining the possible cost of operational 
regulation on investment fund performance.  
  
This thesis begins with a history of investment fund regulation in the United States.  The 
discussion moves to a review of the theoretical underpinnings of financial regulation for 
investment funds. After establishing the historical environment for the regulation, the report 
moves to an explanation of alternative investment strategies and follows with a description of 
their significant growth. The report summarizes the results of the empirical tests, and concludes 
with suggestions for future policymaker inquiry.    
 
While the limitations of the data set constrict the explanatory power of this study, the results 
are indicative of the potential impact that regulations can have on the benefits that alternative 
mutual funds provide to investors. The SEC may be well advised to execute a large-scale 
analysis on the effect of the operational restrictions on alternative mutual funds versus 
comparable unregulated private funds. Insights gained might guide improvements in the 
regulatory structure for this growing sector.  
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Introduction 
 
Topic Introduction  
 
 Since the 2008 financial crisis there has been significant growth in alternative mutual 
funds. Alternative mutual funds are defined as funds that invest in financial assets other than 
equity (stocks) and fixed income (bonds) products. Alternative mutual funds may use 
investment strategies that attempt to move in the opposite direction of the market (hedging for 
instance), or may have uncorrelated performance with  the broader market.[9] The first mutual 
fund opened in Boston in 1924  as a type of investment company that pools money from 
different investors and invests in financial assets[2]. Traditional mutual funds use investment 
strategies that mainly consist of buying and holding either equity or fixed income products, 
where income accrues from cash flow, either interest or dividends, or from appreciation of 
asset prices. While, alternative mutual funds employ complex investment strategies with a 
variety of financial securities and derivatives that seek to generate returns from different 
sources.  Historically, the types of investment strategies used by alternative mutual funds were 
only offered to institutional (e.g. endowments, pension funds, sovereign wealth funds) and 
ultra-high net worth (very wealthy) investors through a variety of private unregulated 
investment funds. However, increased retail investor demand for the potential superior-risk 
adjusted returns of alternative strategies[10], has led alternative mutual funds to become one of 
the fastest growing segment of the asset management industry. In response to this growth, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has undertaken a review process to determine what, 
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if any, regulatory modifications might be necessary to better protect investors of publicly-
registered alternative investment funds. 
Research Question  
 This study’s main research question is: what differences, if any, arise in the risk and 
return characteristics of regulated and unregulated investment funds that use alternative 
investment strategies? The question has policy relevance because in January 2014, the SEC 
officially labeled alternative mutual funds as a “policy topic” which means the regulators are 
interested in learning more about the business practices and the application of existing fund 
regulation for alternative mutual funds.[11]  In pursuit of this goal, the SEC launched an official 
inquiry of alternative mutual funds in August 2014, where the regulator sent a letter (sweep) to 
alternative mutual funds asking for more detailed information about their business.[12] This 
alternative mutual fund sweep is intended to help regulators examine the adaptability and 
compliance of existing investment fund regulation for alternative mutual funds. An answer to 
this study’s research question may have relevance to the current SEC sweep because regulation 
may restrict a fund manager’s flexibility to fully implement a particular strategy, limiting the 
potential benefits that might be offered by such management. Thus, it might be important to 
understand the impact of the regulatory environment so that the costs associated with investor 
protection, measured in forgone risk-adjusted returns for instance, are minimized. The fact that 
regulated and unregulated alternative investment funds now exist provides almost a natural 
experiment for testing the potential impact of regulation on investment fund performance.  
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Evolution of Investment Fund Regulation in the United States 
 
Great Depression  
 The Great Depression was the start of the development of the modern financial 
regulatory system.[13] The severe market crash of 1929 and the resulting economic contraction 
caused more banks to depart from the banking business than any other instance in the history 
of the United States. From 1929 to 1933, the country lost approximately 10,000 banking 
institutions, as the number of depositories fell from 24,000 to 14,000.[14]  Policy makers believed 
the collapse of the financial system contributed to the severity of the recession.[15] The Banking 
Act of 1933, also known as the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA), was one of the most comprehensive 
pieces of financial regulation legislation of its time. A separation of commercial from 
investment banking was imposed, requiring all major commercial banks to dispose of their 
securities affiliates. This change separated the riskiness of securities speculation out of the 
deposit holding commercial banks. In addition, commercial banks were prohibited from 
underwriting investment securities, purchasing bonds for the bank’s own account, and using 
credit for the purchase of securities.  
 While GSA was intended to strengthen the banking system, the lack of investor 
protection regulation and disclosure requirements were also policy problems made apparent by 
the Great Depression.[15] In 1933 Congress passed the Securities Act, the first major piece of 
federal legislation to regulate the offer and sale of securities.  The act’s two objectives were to 
“require that investors receive financial and other significant information concerning securities 
being offer for public sale” and “to prohibit deceit, misrepresentation and other fraud in the 
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sale of securities.” The legislation requires that all material information about a potential 
investment be disclosed to the investing public, so that the true nature and risks of the 
investment is understood by the investor. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was then 
enacted and, created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  The SEC has “broad 
authority over all aspects of the securities industry.”[16] All public companies are required to 
submit periodic financial statements, or face the penalty of perjury. [15] The SEC is the primary 
regulator of alternative mutual funds, and all other investment funds such as traditional mutual 
funds.  
Post World War II  
 The Securities Act of 1934 gave the SEC the authority to establish financial accounting 
standards for publicly held companies. Until 1973, the SEC relied upon the Accounting 
Principles Board (APB), an organization of industry accountants working part-time, to create 
corporate accounting standards.[15] In 1973, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
was formed as a fully independent organization to establish the standards of financial 
accounting for the financial reports of public corporations. FASB states that their standards “are 
important to the efficient functioning of the economy because decisions about the allocation of 
resources rely heavily on credible, concise, and understandable financial information.”[17] This 
was an important step for investor disclosure because FASB strengthened the generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) used by all US public corporations.[17] 
 In 1974, Congress created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), to replace 
a division of the Department of Agriculture that regulates commodities exchanges. The CFTC 
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has the “authority to regulate futures trading in all [commodity] goods, articles, services, rights, 
and interests traded for future delivery.” A futures contract is an agreement to purchase or sell 
a specific quantity of a commodity (e.g. grains, metals) or other financial product (e.g. U.S. 
currency) at a specified price and date.[18]  The CFTC ‘s mission is to, “protect market users and 
the public from fraud, manipulation, and abusive practices in the sale of commodity and 
financial futures and options, and to foster open, competitive option markets.”[7]  While the SEC 
administers and enforces the investment fund regulation, the CFTC regulates the trading of the 
underlying futures contracts that some investment funds use to generate returns.  
 The 1980s and 1990s brought a period of deregulation to financial markets in the United 
States.  A succession of policy changes reduced the operational restrictions of financial 
institutions, and allowed them to expand into new lines of business that had been restricted 
since the Great Depression.[15]  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), also known as the Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999, repealed the Glass-Steagall Legislation of the Great 
Depression that separated commercial and the investment banking.[19]  The GLBA allowed 
financial institutions to form one holding company that could engage in all three activities of 
commercial banking, investment banking, and insurance underwriting.[20]  The GLBA at the time 
it was passed was seen as a way to help American banks grow larger, so they could better 
compete in the global economy. [21]  Aligned with the same deregulatory ideology, Congress 
passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act which limited the CFTC’s and SEC’s oversight 
of the derivatives market, decreasing the regulatory burden on those respective funds, and 
decreasing investor protection regulation. [15] 
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 In response to several financial scandals and devious accounting practices from large 
corporate bankruptcies such as Enron, WorldCom and Tyco; congress passed the Public 
Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act, or Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), in 2002.[22]   
SOX was aimed at enhancing the auditing practice of public corporations in the United States. 
The Act’s major provisions include the prohibition of preferential disclosure to market analysts 
and the requirement of public corporations’ CEOs and CFOs to sign their company’s financial 
statements submitted to the SEC and accept personal liability for fraudulent information. SOX 
also mandated that all public companies have an independent board of directors.[15] The Act 
created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which enlisted a team of 
auditors “to enforce and existing laws against theft and fraud by corporate officers” and to set 
the standards for the inspection and investigation of public companies’ audit firms. [22]  
Additionally, SOX empowered the SEC to review the accounting standards set by the FASB. SOX 
was intended to “restore [investor] confidence” through “strengthening the financial reporting” 
and “generally raising the bar” for US’s public companies.  
Post 2008 Financial Crisis  
 The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 
reconstructed many parts of the financial regulatory system in response to the perceived 
abuses claimed to be partially responsible for the 2008 financial crisis.[15] One integral part of 
the Act is The Volcker Rule, which prohibits proprietary trading and certain fund activities at 
investment banks, while enhancing the capital requirements and imposing increased regulation 
on systemically important nonbank financial companies. The Volcker Rule repealed parts of the 
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Gramm-Leach deregulatory legislation by imposing restrictions on commercial and investment 
banking activities, similar to those enacted by the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933.[15]  Dodd-Frank also 
mandates the formation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) as a division under 
the Treasury Department. The FSOC is “charged with identifying risks to the financial stability of 
the United States; promoting market discipline; and responding to emerging risks to the 
stability of the United States' financial system.”[23] Regulators developed a new regulatory 
framework for financial supervision around the newly created FSOC. Under this new framework 
(Exhibit 1), federal agencies and self-regulatory organizations (SROs) coordinate on multiple 
levels to monitor and regulate financial services to provide investor protections, promote 
effective capital markets and address issues that could pose a “systemic risk” to the financial 
system and the economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘ 
 
 
Exhibit 1: New Fund Regulatory Framework Post ’08 Financial Crisis  [7] 
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 While lawmakers are generally lagging behind in the process of implementing the new 
rules and regulations from the Dodd-Frank legislation (Exhibit 2), regulators have finalized all 
seven rules relating to investment advisers / private funds and have a finalized a majority of the 
11 rules related to investor protection / security laws. [3] Furthermore, in 2012, Congress passed 
section 201 of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) act. This section of the JOBS act 
amended an existed rule under Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933, which removed the 
ban  on general solicitation and advertising by companies conducting private offerings, 
including hedge funds, provided that securities are only sold to “sophisticated investors.”[7] This 
was a new step in allowing private funds to market to a larger audience.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2: Dodd-Frank Rulemaking Progress [3] 
(October 2014) 
 
55% 
11% 
18% 
13% 
3% 
Finalized
Missed Deadline: Not Proposed
Missed Deadline: Proposed
Future Deadline: Not Proposed
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Current Regulatory Environment   
Regulated Funds Overview 
 The SEC defines an “investment company” as a company that issues securities and is 
primarily engaged in the business of investing in securities.[24]   Additionally, an “Investment 
Company invests the money it receives from investors on a collective basis, and each investor 
shares in the profits and losses in proportion to the investors’ interest in the investment 
company. The performance of the investment company will be based on (but it won't be 
identical to) the performance of the securities and other assets that the investment company 
owns.”[24] Federal security laws categorize investment companies into three structures: mutual 
funds (legally known as open-end companies), closed-end funds (legally known as closed-end 
companies) and UITs (legally known as unit investment trusts).[24]   Each fund structure has 
different regulations that govern their operations. The mutual fund structure is the preferred 
structure, with a majority of the over 16,000 investment companies registered with the SEC in 
2013 structured as mutual funds (Exhibit 3)[2].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 3: 2013 Investment Company Breakdown [2] 
 
54.53% 
11.73% 
33.74% 
Mutual Funds Closed-End Funds UITs
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There are four principle securities laws that govern investment companies: the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (’40 Act), the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. These four laws are summarized in Exhibit 4.  This 
study primarily  focuses on the ’40 Act because it is the law “that regulates the structure and 
operations of investment companies through a combination of disclosure requirements and 
restrictions on day-to-day operations.”[2]   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Exhibit 4: Four Principal Securities Laws that Govern Investment Companies[7] 
 
Law Description
Securities Act of 1933
The 1933 Act includes a number of provisions to strengthen investor protections 
and the integrity of securities markets. The Act requires the registration of 
publicly offered securities, providing limited exemptions for certain offerings, 
including: private offerings to a limited number of sophisticated persons or 
institutions; offerings of limited size; intrastate offerings; and securities of 
municipal, state, and federal governments.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The 1934 Act created the SEC, providing it with broad authority to register and 
regulate the securities industry. The Act also defines and outlaws certain types of 
market behavior and provides the SEC with the power to discipline regulated 
entities and other persons who trade in the securities markets. The Act also 
regulates the secondary trading of securities, as well as the physical exchanges 
where securities are traded.
Investment Company Act of 1940
The ICA defines what constitutes an investment company under U.S. law. The ICA 
establishes guidelines to regulate and organize companies engaged in investing, 
reinvesting and trading in securities. Provisions in the ICA impose strict 
disclosure requirements, place limits on the investment strategies and holdings 
of registered investment companies (RICs), and rules regarding the structure of 
RICs. Hedge funds are not generally subject to regulation under the ICA as they 
are excluded from the definition of “investment company” in the ICA.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940
The Advisers Act generally requires persons and firms receiving compensation 
for providing advice about securities to register with the SEC, including hedge 
fund managers with at least $150 million in assets under management. Advisers 
must register using Form ADV, which includes pertinent background information 
on the individual adviser as well as the type of investment advice to be offered. 
Form ADV must be updated at least annually with the SEC.
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 The ’40 Act imposes regulations on the investment strategy and asset allocation of 
mutual fund investment companies. Specifically, a mutual fund cannot invest more than 15 
percent of its net assets in illiquid securities, must maintain asset coverage (an assets to equity 
ratio) of at least 300 percent or comply with mutually agreed upon alternative asset 
segregation requirements, maintain daily liquidity requirements (shares can be redeemed for 
cash daily), and they must provide a daily net asset value (NAV) to investors.[25]  Mutual funds 
are distributed to investors through five channels described below: (1) the direct channel, (2) 
the advice channel, (3) the retirement plan channel, (4) the supermarket channel, and (5) the 
institutional channel. [26] The first four channels serve individual investors, while the institutional 
channel serves institutional investors (e.g. pensions, foundations, endowments). The direct 
channel involves individual investors placing orders directly with mutual fund companies; the 
advice channel involves financial advisors and registered representatives placing orders with 
mutual fund companies on behalf of individual investors, the retirement plan channel consists 
of employer-sponsor defined contribution plans where employers or plan sponsors purchase 
mutual funds on behalf of individual investors, and the supermarket channel where individual 
investors use discount brokers to purchase mutual funds on their behalf.[26]   According to the 
Investment Company Institute (ICI), in 2013, 46 percent of all U.S households owned mutual 
funds[2], with the greatest amount of relative ownership in the 45 to 54 age group, and in the 
household income bracket of $100,000 or more (Exhibit 5).  
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Unregulated Funds Overview 
  
Unregulated Funds 
 Certain private funds are excluded from the definition of an investment company, and 
therefore do not have to be registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940. As shown 
in Exhibit 6, hedge funds, followed by private equity funds, hold the majority of all private funds 
registered with the SEC.[7]  All hedge funds with more than $150 million in assets under 
management (AUM) are required to register with the SEC. Private funds use sections (3)(c)(1) 
and 3(c)(7) of the ’40 Act to allow them to avoid  operational fund regulation with the SEC  in 
return for a restricted investor base [27] This gives private funds greater operational flexibility 
and leaves them with no regulatory restrictions on investment strategy leverage, fee 
Exhibit 5: 2013 US Mutual Fund Ownership Breakdown by Age and Income [2] 
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arrangements, liquidity 
requirements and 
portfolio distributions.[28] 
Private funds typically 
have monthly or quarterly 
liquidity (as opposed to 
daily for mutual funds) for 
investors and report a 
monthly net asset value 
(NAV) as opposed to a daily NAV for mutual funds.[29] The distribution channels for private 
funds are also different, being more decentralized than mutual fund channels. Investors find 
private funds through channels such as investment consultancies, investment funds that invest 
in private funds, and investment bank introductions. Potential purchases of private funds are 
limited to “accredited investors” and “qualified purchasers.”[29]  An accredited investor is 
defined as a sophisticated investor who is deemed to have less of a need for government 
disclosure protection.[30] Examples of accredited investors includes organizations with total 
assets in excess of five million, financial services companies such as banks, employee benefits 
plans with assets in excess of five million, an individual whose net worth or joint net worth 
exceeds one million at the time of purchase excluding the value of the individuals primary 
residence, and individuals’ with yearly incomes of $200,000 or higher in each of their two most 
recent years or joint income with a spouse exceeding $300,000 for those years and a 
reasonable expectation of the same income levels in the current year.[7] The ’40 act defines a 
Exhibit 6: Breakdown of Private Funds Advised by Registered Advisers[7]  
 
60.0% 20.0% 
10.0% 
4.0% 
3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 
Hedge Funds
Private Equity
Other
Securitized Asset
Real Estate
Liquidity Funds
Venture Capital
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“qualified purchaser” as an individual or married couple with over five million in investment 
assets, or an institutional investor who invests on a discretionary basis at least $25 million.[31] 
 
Justifications for Investment Fund Regulation 
 
Financial Stability  
 Financial stability is a primary motivation for financial services regulation. Financial 
stability can be thought of as  “institutions not suddenly collapsing and causing economic 
damage to people who not reasonably would have been expected to anticipate the 
collapse.”[32]     Financial stability is a major concern of policymakers for two reasons. An 
unstable financial system  will inflict undue harm to the general public in times of economic 
distress.[32]  Additionally, one primary function of the financial system is to serve as an 
intermediary between those wishing to invest capital for a rate of return and those wishing to 
utilize the capital productively to generate such a return on investment. Financial instability can 
disrupt this access to credit for market participants, as witnessed in the 2008 financial crisis,[33]  
and thus may have a significant impact on economic growth.   
 Policies to promote financial stability can be segmented into two different groups: 
preventive measures designed to promote behavior conducive to financial stability, and 
remedial measures designed to contain the impact of an actual or threatened outbreak of 
financial instability.[32]  Examples of preventative policy measures include laws enacted through 
congress, rulemaking through government agencies and regulators, and data publication and 
economic forecasts by central banks. Remedial public policy responses to financial instability 
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often take the form of the government serving as the “lender of last resort” to systemically 
important financial institutions during a crisis.  A “lender of last resort” is defined as a 
government institution, normally a central bank, which offers loans to banks or other eligible 
institutions that are experiencing financial difficulty during times of crisis.  The “lender of last 
resort” policy has been used by the U.S. government in the case of a distressed investment 
firm.  For instance, in 1998, the Federal Reserve orchestrated a $3.65 billion capital infusion to 
the investment firm Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) from a consortium of financial 
institutions[34]. LTCM’s excessive use of leverage (debt), and declining investment positions in 
the fall of 1998, made it impossible for the LTCM to meet its margin calls (pay the interest on its 
debt), and caused fears of bankruptcy by creditors[35].  Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve during the fall of 1998 explained the Fed’s decision to facilitate the bailout of 
LTCM as: 
“In situations like this, there is no reason for central bank involvement unless there is a 
substantial probability that a fire sale would result in severe, widespread, and prolonged 
disruptions to financial market activity.…. It was the FRBNY’s [the Federal Reserve] judgment 
that it was to the advantage of all parties—including the creditors and other market 
participants—to engender if at all possible an orderly resolution rather than let the firm go into 
disorderly fire-sale liquidation following a set of cascading cross defaults.”[35] 
 
The LTCM decision was an important precedent in the government’s interaction with 
investment funds.  As published in a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on 
LTCM, “Although no federal money was committed to the recapitalization, FRBNY’s 
intervention raised concerns among some market observers that it could create moral hazard 
by encouraging other large institutions to assume greater risks, in the belief that the Federal 
Reserve would intervene to avoid potential future market disruptions.”[36]  The GAO’s 
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comments reflect the moral hazard dilemma that policymakers face with using lender of last 
resort policies to maintain financial stability.   
Cost-Benefit Discussion 
 The tradeoffs between financial stability regulation and other public policy objectives 
must be considered when analyzing the efficacy of financial services regulatory policy.  In 
regards to preventive policies for promoting financial stability, the benefits of the reduced 
probability of financial instability, must be balanced with the costs that stricter regulations may 
have on the availability and pricing of credit and liquidity.[37]  Put another way, the benefit of 
increased regulation in terms of tighter capital standards or greater restrictions on the activities 
a financial institution may undertake should be weighed against the greater imposed costs of 
compliance and/or lower returns for investors.   Capital requirements are standardized 
requirements for banks and other depository institutions, which determine how much liquidity 
(cash) is required to be held for a certain level of assets by regulatory agencies.[38]  The question 
of governments providing emergency liquidity to struggling financial institutions during times of 
instability, builds off the cost benefit analysis of inducing moral hazard versus the potential for 
financial instability resulting from an institution’s failure. Policymakers in the US have 
historically approached the topic of providing emergency liquidity, or acting as a lender of last 
resort, on a case by case basis, as apparent from the LTCM government-led bailout. 
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Investor Protection Rationale 
 Investor protection is another rationale for financial services regulation, and is the 
underlying justification for a majority of  investment fund regulation.[31]  Investor protection 
regulation may be designed to help investors overcome informational asymmetries that may 
influence market efficiency.[39]  An information asymmetry is a situation in which one party in a 
transaction has more or superior information compared to the other party.[40] These 
informational asymmetries are inherent in relationships where investors rely on others to 
manage a portion of their investment portfolio. Such asymmetry is the basis for the principal-
agent problem that may occur between investors and their investment fund manager. In a 
principal-agent relationship, the principal (investor), with a predefined objective, assigns a task 
to an agent (investment fund manager) to perform the task on the principal’s behalf. If the 
principal’s incentives are not clearly aligned with that of the agents, and if the principal cannot 
monitor the agent’s action, then the agent has the rationale motivation to act undetected in his 
own interests as opposed to the principal’s interests.[41] For the principal-agent relationship to 
become problematic both a conflicting incentive structure and informational barriers must be 
present. [41]  To illustrate this principal-agent dilemma imagine an entrepreneur with a business 
and a potential investor. The entrepreneur has better information than the investor about the 
value of his business, illustrating the information problem. While if the potential investor 
decides to invest, then the entrepreneur has a greater incentive to expropriate more of the 
investors savings by misrepresenting the value of his business. In an effort to profit from his 
informational advantages, the entrepreneur is exploiting his agency position. [42] Such actions 
may be a policy concern because modern capital markets hold a substantial amount of a 
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household’s savings,[43] so it critical that material information be publicly disclosed in order to 
promote efficient capital markets.[42]   
Cost-Benefit Discussion  
 It is the regulator’s job to balance the cost of doing nothing to protect investors against 
the perceived benefits of proactive intervention to protection them.[28] There are direct 
bureaucratic costs, compliance costs, market rigidities due to regulatory barriers, and 
distortions of economic incentives for market participants when regulation is enacted for 
investor protection. Another potential significant cost of investor protection regulation is that it 
can prohibit a segment of investors from investing in certain types of investment products, 
which can lead all members of this investor segment to a less desirable product.[28] Professor 
Franklin Edwards of Columbia Business School believes that hedge funds, a type of private fund, 
are an example of this cost of investor protections. Professor Edwards believes that hedge 
funds  “unencumbered by regulatory restrictions on short selling, leverage, fee arrangements, 
liquidity requirements and portfolio distributions constraints “ are able to” utilize trading 
strategies not typically available to retail investors, relegating these [retail] investors largely to 
investment products provided by mutual funds.” He continues that the investment operational 
flexibility of hedge funds “may be able to provide investors with better downside-protection 
against precipitous falls in asset (stock) price” and by “blocking retail investor access to hedge 
funds [through regulation], [regulation] may impose significant costs on the excluded investors 
by forcing them into inferior investment products, which must be balanced against the 
potential benefits of protecting investors against losses they might occur if they were to invest 
in hedge funds.”[28]  This study seeks to build on the idea discussed by Professor Edwards, by 
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attempting to determine if regulatory constraints impose costs on alternative mutual funds in 
terms of risk or return metrics.  
 
Alternative Investment Fund Overview 
Investment Strategies  
 Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, a majority of investment funds using alternative 
investment strategies were private unregulated funds characterized by their limited 
transparency, illiquidity, high investment minimums, and inaccessibility to the retail investor.[4]   
However, the alternative investing landscape has evolved, and investors can now access 
alternative strategies through a daily liquid and highly transparent mutual fund structure.[4] 
Alternative strategies differ from “traditional” investment strategies in their exposure to 
different asset classes, and in the trading strategy they use to generate returns. While 
traditional investment strategies will typically invest in only stocks and bonds, examples of the 
asset classes used by alternative strategies includes currencies, commodities or real estate. 
While the investment strategy of a traditional fund would typically buy and hold a security with 
the hopes of price appreciation (going long), the investment strategies of alternative funds will 
commonly bet on both price appreciation and depreciation (long/short). The main purpose of 
alternative investment funds within an individual’s portfolio “is to add a complementary source 
(or sources) of return: one that doesn’t necessarily move in lock-step with traditional long-only 
assets, whether they be equities or fixed income.”[4] While the performance of many traditional 
mutual funds is compared on a relative basis to the performance of the broader market, the 
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performance of alternative investment funds is measured against peer funds or a cash 
benchmark, which  reflects the potential diversifying benefit of alternative investment 
strategies.[4]  Copied in Exhibit 7 is a summary of the major alternative strategies used currently 
in financial markets.  These definitions are provided by AQR Capital Management (AQR), one of 
the largest alternative investment fund managers. It is important to take notice that “capturing 
mispricing” is a frequently used term to describe alternative investment strategies in Exhibit 7. 
The absolute return performance of alternatives is only possible, in part, because these funds 
attempt to capture mis-pricings in varying economic conditions.  
In theory, alternative investment strategies allow investors to access “style premia” they 
did not have prior exposure to through traditional investment strategies. Style premia are 
defined as a “risk premiums” that arise from some “economic intuition or a behavioral 
explanation of why an investment should carry an excess return.”[44] [4]  To have increased 
exposure to these style premias, investors need the dynamic and flexible strategies of 
alternative investment funds. The expanded set of investment options (alternative asset 
classes) is one way funds attempt to capture these premias.  The ability to hedge (reduce the 
risk of adverse asset price movements) via short positions and other arbitrage techniques are 
another way alternative investments are potentially able to  offer diversified returns from 
traditional mutual funds.[45] 
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Exhibit 7:  Summary of Alternative Strategies[4] 
 
Convertible Arbitrage
Capture the discount of convertible bonds relative to the fair 
value of their constituent parts (bond + equity call option) 
Dedicated Short Bias
Profit from the inability of many investors to go short 
companies that are overpriced relative to their fundamentals
Emerging Markets
Pursue strategies including Global Macro and various equity 
strategies by trading securities and currencies of emerging 
markets
Equity Market Neutral
Capture systematic mispricing in global equity markets, 
typically between different stocks in the same sector
Event Driven
Trade mispriced securities whose value should converge in a 
corporate event
Fixed Income Arbitrage
Capture a range of mis-pricings in global bond and currency 
markets, including those created by market participants who 
are not profit-maximizing
Global Macro
Capture mis-pricings across major global asset classes, 
including stock, bond, currency, and commodity markets
Long/Short Equity
Pursue a range of opportunities in global stock markets, 
including relative value between sectors and growth-based 
stockpicking
Managed Futures
Profit from the tendency of assets to exhibit short- and long-
term trends
Objectives of Major Alternative Strategies
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 The benefits of alternative strategies were examined by AQR. Researchers at the 
investment management company recreated hypothetical portfolios of possible investments 
under a merger arbitrage (event driven) alternative investment strategy.  The rationale behind 
a merger arbitrage strategy is that by purchasing the shares of the acquired company and 
selling short the shares of the acquiring company in an announced merger agreement, the 
investor now has access to a risk premium through providing insurance to the existing 
stockholders of the acquired company wishing to sell their shares.[46]  AQR also created a 
hypothetical portfolio of investments under a convertible arbitrage alternative investment 
strategy, which seeks to profit from the liquidity premium (or added return investors expect to 
get paid) of owning convertible bonds, as opposed to owning corporate bonds or equity in 
traditional investment strategies.[46]  The two alternative investment portfolios were designed 
by creating a value-weighted portfolio of AQR’s proprietary samples of merger deals since 1963 
and convertible bond issues since 1985. The merger arbitrage portfolio had a leverage ratio (the 
amount of debt relative the fund’s assets) at 1.5:1 and the convertible bond portfolio had 
leverage of 2:1.[46] The sample portfolio returns and volatility (standard deviation of returns)   
were calculated from January 1990 to December 2007. AQR’s test results are contained below 
in Exhibit 8. 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 8: Summary of AQR Alternatives Analysis[4]  
 
Annualized 
Return
Annualized 
Volatility
Coefficient of 
Variation
S&P 
500
MSCI 
World
Convertible Arbitrage 12.00% 5.20% 0.43 0.00 -0.10
Merger Arbitrage 11.80% 5.80% 0.49 0.40 0.40
S&P 500 10.70% 13.60% 1.27
MSCI World Index 8.10% 13.60% 1.68
Correlations
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AQR’s findings indicate that the two alternative strategies profiled in their study 
(convertible arbitrage and merger arbitrage), might have had greater returns and less volatility 
than traditional equity investments, both in the United States (S&P 500) and globally (MSCI 
World Index) from 1990 to 2007. On a risk-adjusted basis, represented by the coefficient of 
variation (annualized volatility / annualized return), both alternative strategies appear to 
require less risk to generate the same return compared to traditional equity investments. The 
performance of convertible arbitrage does not appear to be correlated with either market 
index, while the performance of merger arbitrage has a correlation of .4 with both market 
indices.  One of the study’s limitations is the absence of statistical tests analyzing the 
significance of the differences in performance between alternative and traditional investment 
strategies. However, the results of AQR’s study are still constructive for the discussion on 
alternative investment strategy performance because it is unique that an investment firm with 
such proprietary data publishes its research for public discourse.   
Fund Growth  
As shown in Exhibit 9, total assets under 
management (AUM) in alternative mutual 
funds has grown from under $50 billion in 
2008, to $250 billion in 2013[5], equating to a 
compounded annual growth rate (CAGR)  of 
over 40% for the five year time frame. 
Alternative mutual fund AUM growth has 
0
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Exhibit 9: Alternative Mutual Fund Growth[5]  
(AUM, $ Billions) 
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outpaced the growth of traditional investments, which grew at a CAGR of 8.39% over the same 
time period.[10] The first half of 2014 continued to see strong growth in alternative mutual funds 
with nearly $17 billion of inflows through July 2014.[47] Industry experts forecast this trend of 
strong alternative mutual fund growth to continue well into the future.  For instance Goldman 
Sachs estimates that retail alternatives will maintain a growth rate of 15-20% over the next ten 
years[48]. In addition, Mckinsey & Company forecasts that by 2020 alternatives will comprise up 
to 15% of global assets under management, and 40% of asset management industry revenues, 
up from their current levels of 12% of global assets and 30% of industry revenues.[10] Finally, the 
German financial services firm Deutsche Bank in their September 2014 research study entitled - 
From Alternatives to Mainstream (Part Two) - found that liquid alternatives are the fastest 
growing part of the asset management industry with 67% of investors planning to increase their 
allocation to alternative strategies by 2015, and 30% of hedge fund managers planning to 
launch an alternative mutual fund in the next 
year.  
 The six largest alternative mutual fund 
investment strategies might be classified into 
mutually exclusive groups.  As broken down by 
strategy in Exhibit 10, collectively these six 
largest investment strategies held about 2.3% 
of the nearly $14 trillion in assets under 
management held by all mutual funds in the 
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Exhibit 10: Alternative Mutual Fund Net Assets[8] 
($ Billions, October 2014) 
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United States.[8]  The two largest alternative investment strategies, Long/Short Equity and 
Nontraditional Bonds, grew at an rate of 80.96% and 79.43% respectively in 2013.[49]  Exhibit 11 
contains a listing of mutual fund managers that hold the greatest market share in the six largest 
alternative mutual fund segments. It is worth noting that the top four alternative mutual fund 
managers rank in the top 20 mutual fund investment organizations by assets under 
management[8] ,  so while inflows in alternative mutual funds has been significant, over 40% of 
these inflows have gone to established and experienced investment managers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy Environment  
 In January 2014 the SEC’s Office of Compliance, Inspection, and Examinations (OCIE) 
labeled Alternative Funds as a policy topic in their examination priorities for the year.  The label 
of policy topic means that the SEC has a dual interest in gaining a better understanding of 
business practices in the alternative mutual fund space, and about learning the practical 
application of previously adopted rules and guidance for alternative mutual funds.[11]  In regards 
to fund structure, OCIE is focusing on alternative mutual funds “leverage, liquidity and valuation 
policies and practices” as well as “the [alternative mutual fund’s] staffing, funding, and 
Firm Marketshare Assets ($M)
PIMCO 12.02% 37235
BlackRock 10.09% 31246
Goldman Sachs 9.37% 29023
JP Morgan 8.65% 26794
New York Life 5.18% 16036
Natixis 3.95% 12224
AQR 3.51% 10866
John Hancock 2.96% 9157
Putnam 2.69% 8335
Robeco Investment Management 2.02% 6255
Exhibit 11: Alternative Mutual Fund Manager Market Share [1] 
(AUM, $ Millions) 
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empowerment of boards, compliance personnel, and back-offices.”[11] In connection with the 
end investor, the SEC is focusing on the “the manner in which [alternative mutual] funds are 
marketed to investors,” in respect to “the representation and recommendations made 
regarding the suitability of such investments.”[11]  The suitability of an investment refers to rule 
2111 enforced by the self-regulatory organization the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(FINRA), which requires brokers and associated professionals to “have a reasonable basis to 
believe that a recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security or 
securities is suitable for the customer, based on the information obtained through the 
reasonable diligence of the [firm] or associated person to ascertain the customer’s investment 
profile.”[50]  This release by the OCIE set the framework for the SEC’s focus on alternative 
mutual funds. [47]  
 The SEC held their Compliance Outreach Program National Seminar for Investment 
Advisers and Investment Company’s following the release of the 2014 exam priorities where a 
panel of regulators further clarified their areas of potential concern with alternative mutual 
funds.[5]  The panel built upon the focus areas described in the released, and added two 
potential concerns about (1) the use of a private fund’s prior performance to market a new 
alternative mutual fund that uses a similar strategy and (2) how alternative mutual funds are 
generally explained to the investing public.[47]  The performance issue stems from the fact that 
some alternative mutual fund managers, who have managed similar strategies in a private 
unregulated investment fund, are using the prior performance of their private unregulated 
investment fund to market their alternative mutual fund that must now comply with the 
operational restrictions of the Investment Company Act of 1940. FINRA restricts this practice of 
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using private fund performance to market a public mutual fund.[5]  The SEC panel also cautioned 
that alternative mutual fund managers “should not try to over-simplify the fund’s risks, as 
investors need to understand a fund’s complexities for it to be a suitable investment.”[47] In 
March 2014, the OCIE announced that it was finalizing plans to conduct a national sweep exam 
of alternative mutual funds, with the first phase targeting 15 – 20 funds. The SEC reiterated that 
the sweep will focus on the same areas of liquidity, leverage, and board oversight as dictated in 
the initial OCIE release.  The goals of the sweep is to examine alternative mutual fund  
compliance with the Investment Company Act of 1940 and analyze the effectiveness of the 
regulations for such funds.[51]  
In June 2014, the SEC’s director of its Division of Investment Management, Norm 
Champ, gave the most extensive discussion about alternative mutual funds from a federal 
regulator in a speech to the Practising Law Institute.[6] Excerpts of Champs recommendations 
for alternative mutual fund compliance with the valuation, liquidity, leverage, disclosure, and 
board oversight regulations of ’40 Act are displayed in Exhibit 12. These recommendations, are 
primarily guidance from Director Champ to the alternative mutual funds to assess their overall 
’40 Act compliance.  For example, Director Champ recommends alternative investment funds 
implement improved policies regarding the determination of the fair value of investments in 
order to address the daily valuation requirements of the ’40 Act. The purpose of this piece is to 
supplement the SEC in their examination of alternative mutual fund regulation compliance by 
offering a framework to evaluate a potential market cost of regulation for investment funds.  
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V
al
u
at
io
n
"Issues that alternative mutual fund managers may consider addressing in their 
policies and procedures include: (1) the requirement that the fund monitor for 
circumstances that may necessitate the use of fair value prices, (2) the provision of 
a methodology by which a fund determines fair value, (3) the process for price 
overrides, (4) assurance that controls are in place to review, monitor and approve 
all overrides in a timely manner, and (5) the prompt notification to, and review 
and approval by, persons not directly involved in portfolio management to 
mitigate conflicts of interest."
Li
q
u
id
it
y
"Among the factors that an alternative mutual fund may want to consider in 
assessing a portfolio security’s liquidity are: (1) the frequency of trades and 
quotations for the security; (2) the number of dealers willing to purchase or sell 
the security and the number of other potential purchasers; (3) dealer undertakings 
to make a market in the security; and (4) the nature of the security and the nature 
of the marketplace in which it trades.  These liquidity issues are particularly 
important if the alternative mutual fund discloses that it is pursuing a strategy that 
focuses on illiquid securities such as distressed debt securities."
Le
ve
ra
ge
"To address some of the risks associated with leverage used by alternative mutual 
funds, investment advisers may want to consider taking some additional steps 
when engaging in derivatives transactions.  These advisers may want to consider 
putting in place a risk management framework linked to their funds’ use of 
derivatives, which may include assessing the impact of various market conditions 
on the funds with respect to their use of derivatives."
D
is
cl
o
su
re
"Staff generally believes that all funds that use or intend to use alternative 
investment strategies should assess the accuracy and completeness of their 
disclosure, including whether the disclosure is presented in an understandable 
manner using plain English.  Further, any disclosure of principal investment 
strategies related to alternative investment strategies generally should be 
tailored specifically to how a fund expects to be managed and should address 
those strategies that the fund expects to be the most important means of 
achieving its objectives and that it anticipates will have a significant effect on its 
performance."
B
o
ar
d
 O
ve
rs
ig
h
t
"The fund board should know its ’40 Act obligations to continue to review and 
approve the fund’s policies and procedures to ensure they are reasonably 
designed to prevent violations of the federal securities laws, and in particular the 
policies and procedures used with regard to the ’40 Act areas previously discussed, 
such as valuation, liquidity, leverage, and disclosure...boards should take care 
that, when naming alternative mutual funds, their names are not 
misleading...accordance with the ‘40 Act, if an alternative" fund’s name suggests a 
focus in a particular type of investment, the fund needs to have a policy to invest 
at least 80% of its assets in that investment."
Summary
Exhibit 12: Commentary on Alternative Mutual Fund Regulatory Compliance[6]  
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Empirical Implications of Differences between Regulated and Unregulated Funds 
 
Methodology 
 
Research Question:  
 
Does regulation affect fund performance? What differences, if any, arise in the risk and return 
characteristics of regulated and unregulated investment funds that use alternative investment 
strategies? 
  
This analysis was designed to test for the performance differences between alternative mutual 
funds and private funds.  
Method: 
 
Two comparable data sets were created of 36 monthly percentage returns for samples of 
private funds and alternative mutual funds across the six largest alternative investment 
strategies. Four performance metrics were calculated from each sample of private funds and 
mutual fund returns: average monthly percentage return, average monthly standard deviation 
of returns, the coefficient of variation over the 36 month time period, and the beta compared 
to a broad market index.  The beta coefficient is defined as the covariance of a fund’s returns 
with the market returns, typically the S&P 500, divided by the variance of the market returns.[52]  
The beta is a measure of the degree to which higher market returns lead to an expectation of 
higher security (investment funds) returns.[52]  For example, an investment fund with a beta of 
two implies that given an observed market return of 10 percent, the expected return of the 
investment fund would be 20 percent.[52]  The coefficient of variation (CV) is a normalized 
measure of risk-adjusted returns for investment funds[53]. It is a unit free number that can be 
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used as a basis for comparison. For instance, if the CV of asset A is 1 and CV of asset B is ½ then 
Asset B requires less risk per unit of return but it may be the case that the expected return of 
asset B is 2% while the expected return of Asset A is 20%.  Exhibit 13 summarizes the 
significance of these four measures of performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistical Tests 
 
Three statistical tests were performed to test for the existence of significant differences 
in fund performance: (1) an unpaired t-test to analyze whether average monthly returns were 
significantly different, (2) an f-test for two sample variances to test whether the funds 
volatilities (standard deviations) were significantly different, and (3) a Chow test to analyze 
whether the fund correlation coefficients (betas) with the market (S&P 500) were significantly 
different. The outcome of these tests - if the other variables aside from the operational 
restrictions of the ’40 Act were truly isolated – may be indicative of the effect of regulation. 
 
 
Exhibit 13: Description of Performance Metrics 
 
Metric Significance Explanation
Average Monthly Return Indicates the absolute performance of investment funds
Average Monthly SD (Vol) Indicates the volatility (risk) of the monthly returns of the investment funds
Coefficient of Variation
Indicates how much risk is needed to generate a certain amount of return; a 
lower ratio implies better risk-adjusted returns  for investors
Beta
Indicates the tendency of fund returns to move with the market: lower beta 
implies more diversifed performance for investors
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Sample Description 
Alternative Mutual Funds  
The six largest alternative investment strategy categories by assets under management 
(AUM) were used to classify funds and are based on Morningstar Category classifications, which 
are designed to help investors make meaningful comparisons between investment funds.[9] 
Morningstar covers over 479,000 investment offerings, including the universe of alternative 
mutual funds. Only funds with a three year track record were kept in the six alternative mutual 
fund samples in order to ensure adequate data. The sample period is November 2011 to 
October 2014.  There are a total of 205 funds in the alternative mutual fund sample.  The 
sample within each alternative investment category was then contracted further by keeping the 
mutual fund share class with the highest return from each fund to be represented in each 
category. To cater toward varying investor preferences, mutual fund share classes present 
different fee and expense structures for the same investment portfolio of securities. For 
example, a fund may have a Class A, Class B, and Class C, where Class A might have a type of fee 
that investors pay when they purchase fund shares (front-end sales load), Class B might have a 
type of fee that investors pay only when they redeem fund shares (contingent deferred sales 
load), and Class C can have a mix of the two arrangements.[54]   For this study, the best 
performing fund class for each mutual fund was selected for each fund, to use the fund’s 
highest performing fee structure for investors. The individual observations (fund’s monthly 
returns) were then used to compute an index constructed by computing the weighted average 
monthly returns for each of the six alternative investment strategy categories. The fund’s 
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weighting within each index was based upon each fund’s total assets under management as a 
percentage of the total alternative investment strategy’s assets.  Appendix II contains the 
specific breakdown of each fund and their respective weighting in the six alternative mutual 
fund indices constructed for this analysis.   
Private Fund Sample 
The HFRX Indices offered by Hedge Fund Research, Inc. (HFR) were chosen as 
representative of comparable private fund groups. HFR claims its HFRX indices seek to 
represent the performance of the hedge funds within a defined strategy. The total monthly 
percentage returns of the six indices most comparable with the six largest alternative mutual 
fund categories were calculated over the same November 2011 to October 2014 (36 month 
time frame). Careful attention was paid to best aligning the asset class and investment style of 
the alternative mutual fund and the private fund using the Morningstar and HFRX Index 
definitions. For example – as shown in Appendix III- the sample of alternative mutual funds 
categorized as Long/Short Equity by Morningstar were paired with the hedge funds included in 
the HFRX Equity Hedge (total) Index. All funds in both groups only invest in equity (stocks) and 
use a long/short investment strategy to generate returns for investors. This methodology was 
extended to pair the regulated and unregulated alternative investment funds across the other 
five investment strategies of Nontraditional Bond, Currencies, Multi-Alternative, Managed 
Futures and Market Neutral. 
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Exhibit 14: Sample Average Metrics 
(November 2011 – October 2014) 
Vehicle 
Private 
Fund
Mutual 
Fund
Private 
Fund
Mutual 
Fund
Private 
Fund
Mutual 
Fund
Return (monthly) 0.11% -0.01% 0.01% 0.19% 0.02% -0.07%
SD (monthly) 0.67% 1.41% 0.71% 1.79% 0.76% 0.66%
Compounded Annual Return 1.30% -0.11% 0.14% 2.32% 0.22% -0.87%
Compounded Annual SD 8.39% 18.31% 8.84% 23.68% 9.52% 8.20%
Coefficient of Variation 6.24 -152.39 61.73 9.34 42.10 -9.07
Beta 0.68 1.25 -0.27 0.01 0.69 1.67
Coefficient of Variation Difference
Annual Returns Difference
Annual Volatil ity Difference
Beta Difference
158.63 52.39 51.17
1.41% -2.18% 1.09%
-9.92% -14.84% 1.32%
-0.57 -0.28 -0.98
Currencies Managed Futures Market Neutral
Vehicle 
Private 
Fund
Mutual 
Fund
Private 
Fund
Mutual 
Fund
Private 
Fund
Mutual Fund
Return (monthly) 0.40% 0.52% 0.14% 0.17% 0.37% 0.10%
SD (monthly) 1.35% 1.38% 0.44% 0.99% 0.86% 0.56%
Compounded Annual Return 4.94% 6.48% 1.72% 2.03% 4.55% 1.24%
Compounded Annual SD 17.46% 17.89% 5.42% 12.60% 10.79% 6.94%
Coefficient of Variation 3.35 2.63 3.10 5.93 2.31 5.45
Beta 1.65 1.63 2.94 2.03 1.85 2.61
Coefficient of Variation Difference
Annual Returns Difference
Annual Volatil ity Difference
Beta Difference 0.02 0.91 -0.77
-1.54% -0.31% 3.31%
-0.43% -7.18% 3.86%
Long / Short Equity Multi-Alternative Non-Traditional Bond
0.72 -2.83 -3.14
Vehicle Private Funds Mutual Funds %  D 
Average Average PF vs MF
Return (monthly) 0.18% 0.15% 16.49%
SD (monthly) 0.80% 1.13% -29.45%
Compounded Annual Return 2.13% 1.82% 16.64%
Compounded Annual SD 10.02% 14.46% -30.75%
Coefficient of Variation 4.55 7.51 -39.44%
Beta 1.26 1.53 -18.10%
Coefficient of Variation Difference
Annual Returns Difference
Annual Volatil ity Difference
Beta Difference
-2.96
0.30%
-4.45%
-0.28
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Data Observations 
The arithmetic mean of private fund returns was 16.64% greater on an absolute basis, 
30% less volatile, and nearly 40% greater on a risk-adjusted basis than the arithmetic mean of 
alternative mutual fund returns over the observed period. The average beta of the private fund 
samples was 1.26, which was 18% less than the average beta of 1.53 for the alternative mutual 
fund samples. The largest observed difference in average annualized returns was between the 
Non-Traditional Bond private funds (4.55%) and mutual funds (1.24%), while the largest 
observed difference in volatilities were between Managed Futures private and mutual funds (-
14.84%). Long/Short Equity mutual funds compared to similar private funds, had a higher 
observed  average return (6.48% versus 4.94%) ), a lower CV (2.63 versus 3.35), and a lower 
beta (1.63 versus 1.65).  
Limitations 
 Alternative mutual funds are still a growing segment of the asset management industry. 
Each alternative mutual fund category only had a portion of the total current mutual fund 
offerings, because many alternative mutual funds did not exist three years ago. The 
Multialternative Segment had as many as 47 percent of its category sample deleted because of 
the significant growth over the past three years in the segment. Another limitation was the size 
of the data set. It was not possible to get a largest data than 36 month performance because 
the alternative mutual fund segment is a new development since the last economic recession in 
2008.  
Private fund (hedge fund and private equity funds) performance data is scare.[55]  While 
several commercial enterprises collect performance data on private funds, “they do not obtain 
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information for all funds; they [commercial enterprises] often do not disclose, or even collect, 
fund cash flows  and the source of the data is sometimes obscure, resulting in concerns about 
sample biases.”[56]  The lack of real representative data on the private fund performance stems 
from three reasons: (1) participation is voluntary in any data base, (2) most commercially 
available hedge fund databases formed in the mid-1990s, and (3) different databases have 
different criteria for identifying the private funds included in their database.[55]  For these 
reason, indices of private fund performance (HFRX Indices in particular) had to be utilized to 
serve as a proxy for private fund performance. This makes the ‘apples-apples’ comparison very 
difficult between a regulated and a non-regulated alternative investment fund. 
Another limitation is HFR, the indices’ producer, describes the HFRX indices construction 
methodology as utilizing “state-of-the art quantitative techniques and analysis; multi-level 
screening, cluster analysis, Monte-Carlo simulations and optimization techniques ensure that 
each Index is a pure representation of its corresponding investment focus.” However, as 
industry experts note, the HFRX’s “lack of clear transparency with respect to [the] extremely 
complex calculation of weighting in an index” is one of the index’s unique limitations.[57] The 
HFRX index strengths are HFR’s relatively large 7000 hedge fund data sample, and as investable 
indices, HFRX indices more accurately represent the performance accessible to investors 
compared to other hedge fund indices. [57] 
Biases  
 Two main biases arise in hedge fund indices: survivorship bias and selection bias.[55]  As 
Professor David Hsieh of Duke’s Fuqua School of Business wrote, “Survivorship bias arises when 
a sample of hedge funds includes only funds that are operating at the end of the sampling 
 39 
 
Honors Thesis Jared Ziment 
period and excludes funds that have ceased operations during the period. Presumably, funds 
cease operation because of poor performance. Therefore, the historical return performance of 
the sample is biased upward and the historical risk is biased downward relative to the universe 
of all funds.” Professor Hsiesh writes that selection bias in hedge fund data “manifests itself” in 
two ways. The first: “Hedge funds that satisfy the inclusion criteria of a vendor may enter a 
database on the basis of their track record and assets under management. On the one hand, 
presumably, only those funds that have “good” performance and are looking to attract new 
investors want to be included in a database. Therefore, hedge funds in a database tend to have 
better performance than those that were excluded.” The second manifestation of the data’s 
selection bias arises from the voluntary nature of fund participation in a database, which allows 
the database vendors to introduce sampling biases through their inclusion criteria.[55]  The HFRX 
indices have been criticized for their susceptibility to survivorship bias by allowing funds to 
voluntarily stop posting returns, and their susceptibility to selection bias but not including 
closed funds and funds with less than $50 million in assets under management.[57]  
The alternative mutual fund sample is subject to survivorship bias because only funds 
that had recorded performance over the 36 month time period were eligible to be included in 
the representative index. The Morningstar mutual fund database is subject to survivorship bias, 
because Morningstar removes failed mutual funds annually from its database.[58]  The private 
fund sample is still expected to have greater survivorship problems because of the difficulty 
with verifying the completeness of historical records on defunct private funds[55]. This would 
imply that the average return is lower, and the variance higher, for the true population of 
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private funds compared to this study’s sample. This bias would exaggerate the benefits of 
private funds.  These biases are considered when discussing the implications of the test results.  
Test Results  
Test 1 
Table one shows a summary of the results of the six unpaired t-tests used to analyze whether 
the monthly returns between alternative mutual funds was significantly difference across any 
of the profiled alternative investment strategies.  
Hypothesis:  
H0: μ1 – μ2 = 0,   =.05 
H1: μ1 – μ2 ≠ 0 
μ1 = Hedge Fund Index Returns, 
 μ2= Alternative Mutual Fund Index Returns 
Summary of Test Results: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Average Monthly Returns P-Value Statistically Significant?
Private 
Fund
0.11%
Mutual 
Fund
-0.01%
Private 
Fund
0.01%
Mutual 
Fund
0.19%
Private 
Fund
0.02%
Mutual 
Fund
-0.07%
Private 
Fund
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Discussion of Test Results: 
The null hypothesis was failed to be rejected across the six statistical tests indicating that there 
is no evidence, based on this sample, to believe that the returns of alternative mutual funds 
and private fund are statistically difference.  The closest test to a significant relationship was 
the Non-Traditional Bond alternative strategy category. The test for significant differences in 
mean returns yielded the lowest p-value of the total sample at .13, however was still greater 
than the .05 significance level.  
 
Test 2 
Table 2 shows a summary of the results of the six f-tests for differences in variances used to test 
whether funds’ volatilities (standard deviations, risk) were significantly different across the 
profiled alternative investment strategies.  
Hypothesis: 
H0:σx = σy ,  
HA:σx ≠ σy or HA:σx > σy or HA:σy > σx 
σ2x = Hedge Fund Index Variance 
σ2y  = Alternative Mutual Fund Index Variance 
 =.05 
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Summary of Test Results: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion of Test Results: 
The null hypothesis was rejected in four of the six F-tests.  There is sufficient empirical evidence 
to state that the differences between the variances of the private fund and alternative mutual 
fund samples are statistically significant at the .05 confidence level. Private funds in the 
Currencies, Managed Futures, and Multi-Alternative segments had significantly lower 
volatilities compared to comparable alternative mutual funds.  Non-Traditional Bond 
alternative mutual funds had a significantly lower volatility compared to private funds. The 
Average Monthly Volatility F-Statistic Statistically Significant?
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variances of Market Neutral and Long/Short equity investment funds showed no statistical 
difference between regulatory statuses.   
Test 3 
Table 3 shows a summary of the results of the six Chow tests used to analyze whether the fund 
beta coefficients with the market (S&P 500) were significantly different. 
Hypothesis: 
H0: β1  = β2,  =.05 
HA: β1  ≠  β2 
β1= Hedge Fund Index Beta to S&P 500, β2 = Alternative Mutual Fund Index Beta to S&P 500 
Summary Results:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beta to S&P 500 P-Value Statistically Significant?
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Discussion of Test Results: 
The six Chow tests for significant differences in the betas of the fund sample result in one 
significant difference. The Non-Traditional Bond private funds had a statistically significant 
lower beta to the S&P 500 than comparable alternative mutual funds. The other five alternative 
strategy segments did not show a significant difference between fund sample betas.  
Summary Discussion 
 All investment fund performance metrics and statistical test results are summarized in 
the Study Summary Table contained in Appendix I. The difference in absolute performance of 
alternative mutual funds versus private funds was not significant for the 36 month time frame 
across any of the six alternative investment strategies. The variances of the two fund groups 
were significantly lower in the Currencies, Managed Futures, and Multi-Alternative strategies. 
Non-Traditional Bond mutual funds have a statistically significant lower volatility than 
comparable hedge funds. Fund structure within the Market Neutral and Long/Short Equity 
segments did not yield a significant difference in volatility. The output of these two tests can be 
combined to gain further insight into the performance of the different funds, as reflected in the 
fund’s CV.  A lower relative CV ratio indicates that the fund is generating the same amount of 
return with a lower per unit amount of risk.  
From the statistical tests above, it can be inferred that for the same level of returns 
privates investment funds within the Multi-Alternative and Non-Traditional Bond segments can 
provide their investors with lower volatility, while alternative mutual funds in the Managed 
Futures segment seem to provide their investors with lower volatility for the same level of 
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return.  Market Neutral and Long/Short Equity strategies did not show any significant 
differences in their returns or volatility. The CV’s of the Currency and Market Neutral 
alternative mutual funds were negative because of the negative monthly return index average.  
The third statistical test performed was the Chow test to analyze whether the betas of 
the alternative investment funds were significantly different between regulated and 
unregulated funds. An investment fund’s return’s beta indicates the explanatory influence of 
broader market moves on the investment fund’s performance. Alternative strategies are 
marketed to investors  as providing better protection from market volatility[45]. The Non-
Traditional Bond private funds had a statistically significant lower beta to the S&P 500 
compared to the beta of Non-Traditional Bond alternative mutual funds. There was not a 
statistically significant difference between the betas of the other five alternative investment 
strategies.  
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Implications for Future Research 
 
 The analysis presented here is a first effort to measure meaningful differences in 
outcomes between regulated and unregulated investments funds.  This first effort can be 
improved in a number of ways.  For the statistical results to have real explanatory power more 
data is needed over a longer time period. In addition, there would have to be more precise 
definitions of investment funds, development of methods to address the sample biases, the use 
of audited returns instead of separate reporting, and the sampling of the historical 
performance of the underlying assets to better isolate the drivers of alternative fund returns. 
The results of this study do seem to indicate the potential for the impact of regulation of fund 
performance.  Across three of the alternative investment strategies, private funds had a 
statistically lower volatility. There are numerous explanations for this result however. First, 
unregulated funds do indeed expand investment opportunities and can exploit options in 
productive ways.  Second, regulated funds could be using a riskier (higher volatility) strategy to 
compensate for the liquidity regulations.  In effect, a type of moral hazard could be developed 
for regulated alternative mutual funds.  That is, the benefits that alternative strategies present 
in an unregulated fund structure might not be present for alternative mutual funds. Regulated 
funds then potentially attempt to compensate for various constraints by holding, on balance, a 
more risky portfolio, with returns held constant, than unregulated funds. Behavioral models are 
needed to analyze such situations with empirical implications being derived from those models.  
Such an approach is beyond the scope of the current analysis but the results are suggestive for 
the need for better modeling of investment decisions and the effects of regulation on those 
decisions. 
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 A regulatory effort for gathering private fund performance data is very important to 
understanding investor protection regulations in the world of alternative strategies. Without 
having this insight, unintended consequences of investor protection regulation may manifest 
itself in the reduction of the effectiveness of alternative investment strategies in the retail 
investors’ portfolio.  The first step for the SEC to undertake this analysis is to build a more 
complete data set of private fund performance. While it may be politically and practically 
infeasible to send an inquiry to all private funds for their performance data, it would be possible 
to aggregate much existing performance data from the commercial vendors of hedge fund data. 
The limitations of these data sets are well documented as described above, yet this would be a 
starting point for understanding how unregulated funds have performed, and whether any of 
their performance can be explained by their unregulated status. True comparable data sets, 
with significant performance histories could then begin to be constructed between alternative 
mutual funds and private funds. Once an ‘apples-apples’ data set of mutual funds and private is 
constructed, regulators can replicate this study’s methodology of testing for significant 
differences in fund returns, volatilities, and betas. If the SEC’s empirical work helps to answer 
this study’s central question, then it would help regulators have a clearer perspective on the 
cost of regulation for these funds. If the ’40 Act is found to be too burdensome for investors in 
alternatives relative to their cost, then the SEC might consider alternative, but productive, 
regulatory changes preserving investor confidence while enabling the exploitation of new 
methods.  
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Appendix II – Alternative Mutual Fund Index Construction  
 
The components of the six alternative mutual fund samples are contained below. All asset data 
listed is of October 2014 from Morningstar’s mutual fund research platform.   
 
Currencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fund Name Ticker Inception Date Total Assets Segment Weight
PIMCO Emerging Markets Currenc PLMIX 5/31/2005 6288 61.42%
JHancock Absolute Return Curre JCUNX 7/30/2010 2007 19.61%
Eaton Vance Diversified Curren EAIIX 3/1/2011 629 6.14%
Lord Abbett Emerging Markets LDMAX 10/19/2004 369 3.60%
Merk Hard Currency MHCIX 4/1/2010 247 2.41%
Templeton Hard Currency ICPHX 12/31/1996 246 2.40%
JPMorgan International Currenc JCIAX 3/30/2007 115 1.12%
Federated Prudent DollarBear PSAFX 12/8/2008 98 0.96%
ProFunds Rising US Dollar Inve RDPIX 2/17/2005 87 0.85%
Columbia Absolute Ret Ccy & In RARAX 6/15/2006 51 0.50%
FX Strategy FXFAX 8/3/2011 42 0.41%
Merk Absolute Return Currency MAAIX 4/1/2010 41 0.40%
Ashmore Emerging Markets Ccy ECYAX 12/8/2010 10 0.10%
ProFunds Falling US Dollar FDPIX 2/17/2005 7 0.07%
Number of Funds 14
Total Index Assets 10237
Total Strategy Assets 10350
Sample Percentage 98.91%
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Managed Futures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market Neutral 
 
 
 
 
 
Fund Name Ticker Inception Date Total Assets % of Segment
AQR Managed Futures Strategy I AQMIX 1/6/2010 6240 62.29%
Natixis ASG Managed Futures St AMFAX 7/30/2010 1318 13.16%
Catalyst Hedged Futures Strate HFXAX 12/15/2005 512 5.11%
LoCorr Managed Futures Strateg LFMAX 3/22/2011 448 4.47%
Equinox MutualHedge Futures St MHFAX 5/24/2011 301 3.00%
Altegris Managed Futures Strat MFTAX 8/26/2010 264 2.64%
Guggenheim Managed Futures Str RYYMX 3/29/2010 229 2.29%
Aspen Managed Futures Strategy MFBTX 8/2/2011 205 2.05%
State Street/Ramius Mgd Futs S RTSRX 9/13/2011 125 1.25%
Altegris Macro Strategy I MCRAX 6/1/2011 115 1.15%
Forward Commodity L/S Strategy FTEZX 12/31/2010 91 0.91%
Princeton Futures Strategy I PFFAX 7/8/2010 85 0.85%
Grant Park Managed Futures Str GPFAX 3/4/2011 54 0.54%
Dunham Alternative Strategy N DAASX 2/12/2009 17 0.17%
Arrow Managed Futures Strategy MFTFX 4/29/2010 14 0.14%
Number of Funds 32
Total Index Assets 28224
 Total Strategy Assets 35531
Sample Percentage 79.43%
Number of Funds 15
Total Index Assets 10018
Total Strategy Assets 12906
Sample Percentage 77.62%
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Long / Short Equity  
 
 
 
Fund Name Ticker Inception Date Total Assets Segment %
Merger Investor MERFX 1/31/1989 5424 19.22%
Calamos Market Neutral Income CVSIX 5/10/2000 4197 14.87%
PIMCO Fundamental Advtg Abs Re PFATX 2/29/2008 4110 14.56%
GMO Alpha Only IV GAPOX 3/2/2006 3072 10.88%
AQR Diversified Arbitrage ADAIX 1/15/2009 2674 9.47%
Arbitrage ARBFX 10/17/2003 2499 8.85%
Hussman Strategic Growth HSGFX 7/24/2000 1038 3.68%
TFS Market Neutral TFSMX 9/7/2004 770 2.73%
JPMorgan Research Market Neutr JPMNAX 12/31/1998 736 2.61%
Arbitrage Event-Driven AEDNX 10/1/2010 683 2.42%
BlackRock Emerging Mkt L/S Eq BLSAX 10/6/2011 572 2.03%
JPMorgan Multi-Cap Market Neut OGNAX 5/23/2003 415 1.47%
Touchstone Merger Arbitrage In TMGAX 8/9/2011 415 1.47%
Vanguard Market Neutral VMNIX 10/19/1998 283 1.00%
Deutsche Diversified Market Ne DDMAX 10/13/2006 223 0.79%
Federated Absolute Return Inst FMAAX 6/28/2007 200 0.71%
Causeway Global Absolute Retur CGAIX 1/24/2011 167 0.59%
Turner Spectrum Instl TSPEX 5/7/2009 128 0.45%
JPMorgan Market Neutral HSKAX 11/30/2005 117 0.41%
American Century Equity Mkt Ne ALISX 9/30/2005 117 0.41%
Whitebox Market Neutral Equity WBLFX 6/1/2004 83 0.29%
American Century Mkt Neutral ACVQX 10/31/2011 77 0.27%
BPV Wealth Preservation BPVPX 10/4/2011 74 0.26%
Turner Medical Sciences Long/S TMSEX 2/7/2011 40 0.14%
Prudential Jennison Market Neu PJNAX 4/23/2010 30 0.11%
PSI Market Neutral FXMAX 8/25/2010 22 0.08%
UBS Equity Long-Short Multi-St BMNAX 6/30/2010 16 0.06%
Catalyst Event Arbitrage CEAAX 6/30/1997 15 0.05%
Visium Event Driven Investor VIDVX 12/29/2000 15 0.05%
Zacks Market Neutral ZMNAX 7/24/2008 9 0.03%
AllianceBern Mkt Ntrl Strat US AMUIX 8/3/2010 3 0.01%
Purisima All-Purpose PURLX 11/1/2005 0 0.00%
Number of Funds 58
Total Index Assets 44115
Total Strategy Assets 56884
Sample Percentage 77.55%
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Fund Name Ticker Inception Date Total Assets %  Segment
MainStay Marketfield I MFADX 7/31/2007 16036 36.35%
Gateway A GATEX 2/19/2008 7982 18.09%
Robeco Boston Partners L/S Rsr BPIRX 9/30/2010 5343 12.11%
Diamond Hill Long-Short A DIAMX 1/31/2005 3724 8.44%
Wasatch Long/Short Investor FMLSX 8/1/2003 2576 5.84%
Highland Long/Short Equity Z HEOAX 12/5/2006 932 2.11%
Forward Tactical Growth Inst FTAGX 9/14/2009 894 2.03%
Robeco Boston Partners L/S Equ BPLSX 11/16/1998 868 1.97%
CBRE Clarion Long/Short Instl CLSIX 11/20/2000 712 1.61%
Schooner A SCNAX 8/29/2008 417 0.95%
Highland Long/Short Healthcare HHCAX 5/5/2008 386 0.87%
Aberdeen Equity Long-Short Ins MLSAX 6/29/2004 355 0.80%
Ironclad Managed Risk IRONX 10/14/2010 334 0.76%
Giralda Manager GDAMX 7/19/2011 248 0.56%
ASTON/River Road Long-Short N ALSIX 5/4/2011 238 0.54%
ASTON/Anchor Capital Enhanced AMDSX 3/3/2010 206 0.47%
Schwab Hedged Equity SWHEX 9/3/2002 199 0.45%
LS Opportunity LSOFX 9/29/2010 176 0.40%
Forester Value I FVILX 6/8/2009 146 0.33%
Caldwell & Orkin Market Opport COAGX 8/24/1992 128 0.29%
JPMorgan Research Equity Long/ JLSAX 5/28/2010 128 0.29%
Toews Hedged Core S THSMX 6/4/2010 117 0.27%
RiverPark Long/Short Opportuni RLSIX 9/30/2009 117 0.27%
Quaker Event Arbitrage A QEAAX 6/7/2010 116 0.26%
Glenmede Long/Short GTAPX 9/29/2006 108 0.24%
AdvisorOne Enhanced Income N CLEIX 10/1/2009 103 0.23%
Toews Hedged Core L THLGX 6/4/2010 94 0.21%
Dividend Plus Income Inv DIVPX 11/22/2010 90 0.20%
Hussman Strategic Internationa HSIEX 12/31/2009 88 0.20%
Toews Hedged Core W THIDX 6/4/2010 86 0.19%
Orinda SkyView Multi-Manager H OHEIX 3/31/2011 83 0.19%
Alger Dynamic Opportunities Z ADOZX 12/29/2010 81 0.18%
Touchstone Dynamic Equity Inst TDELX 12/9/2005 77 0.17%
Navigator Equity Hedged I NAVIX 12/28/2010 75 0.17%
RiverPark/Gargoyle Hedged Valu RGHIX 1/3/2000 75 0.17%
Hancock Horizon Quant Long/Sho HHQAX 9/30/2008 74 0.17%
Burnham Financial Long/Short A BURFX 4/30/2004 71 0.16%
Madison Covered Call & Equity MENAX 11/2/2009 57 0.13%
Glenmede Total Market GTTMX 12/21/2006 57 0.13%
Forward Tactical Enhanced Advi FTENX 4/15/2011 47 0.11%
Bridgeway Managed Volatility BRBPX 6/29/2001 45 0.10%
Guggenheim Long Short Equity F RYAMX 3/31/2004 43 0.10%
AmericaFirst Defensive Growth DGQIX 5/23/2011 41 0.09%
FundX Tactical Upgrader TACTX 2/29/2008 39 0.09%
Nuveen Equity Long/Short I NELIX 12/30/2008 39 0.09%
Hatteras Long / Short Equity A HLSAX 5/2/2011 35 0.08%
Eaton Vance Risk-Managed Equit EROIX 2/29/2008 34 0.08%
ICON Long/Short S IOLZX 5/6/2004 33 0.07%
Keeley Alternative Value I KALIX 4/1/2010 32 0.07%
Catalyst Hedged Insider Buying STVAX 10/28/2010 28 0.06%
James Long-Short JAZZX 5/23/2011 27 0.06%
Huntington Disciplined Equity HDEAX 7/29/2011 18 0.04%
Dunham Dynamic Macro A DAAVX 4/29/2010 14 0.03%
Turner Titan Instl TTLEX 2/7/2011 12 0.03%
Philadelphia Invmt Ptnrs New G PIPGX 6/8/2011 12 0.03%
Guggenheim Alpha Opportunity A SAOAX 11/7/2008 10 0.02%
Toews Hedged Core Frontier THEMX 5/14/2009 6 0.01%
Leigh Baldwin Total Return LEBOX 7/31/2008 3 0.01%
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Non-Traditional Bond 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fund Name Ticker Inception Date Total Assets Segment Weight
JPMorgan Strategic Income Opps JSORX 10/10/2008 26262 17.05%
Goldman Sachs Strategic Income GSZIX 6/30/2010 25915 16.83%
BlackRock Strategic Income Opp BSIIX 2/5/2008 22079 14.34%
PIMCO Unconstrained Bond Inst PFIUX 6/30/2008 18277 11.87%
Putnam Diversified Income Y PDVYX 7/1/1996 6954 4.52%
BlackRock Global Long/Short Cr BGCIX 9/30/2011 6740 4.38%
FPA New Income FPNIX 4/1/1969 5830 3.79%
Driehaus Active Income LCMAX 11/8/2005 4531 2.94%
Eaton Vance Glbl Macr Absolute EIGMX 6/27/2007 4230 2.75%
MainStay Unconstrained Bond I MSDIX 1/2/2004 2514 1.63%
Prudential Absolute Return Bon PADQX 3/30/2011 2460 1.60%
Scout Unconstrained Bond Instl SUBFX 9/29/2011 2182 1.42%
PIMCO Credit Absolute Return I PCARX 8/31/2011 1519 0.99%
JHancock Short Duration Credit JMBNX 10/30/2009 1477 0.96%
Legg Mason BW Absolute Return LROIX 2/28/2011 1359 0.88%
Loomis Sayles Strategic Alpha LASYX 12/15/2010 1309 0.85%
Driehaus Select Credit DRSLX 9/30/2010 1198 0.78%
Eaton Vance Glbl Macro Abs Ret EGRIX 8/31/2010 1183 0.77%
PIMCO Floating Income Instl PFIIX 7/30/2004 1169 0.76%
Putnam Absolute Return 300 Y PYTRX 12/23/2008 1099 0.71%
Metropolitan West Unconstraine MWCIX 9/30/2011 1041 0.68%
Western Asset Total Return Unc WAASX 8/4/2008 876 0.57%
Pioneer Dynamic Credit Y RCRYX 4/29/2011 815 0.53%
Hatteras Long / Short Debt Ins HFINX 5/2/2011 610 0.40%
Dreyfus Opportunistic Fixed In DSTRX 7/11/2006 578 0.38%
Delaware Diversified Floating DDFLX 2/26/2010 504 0.33%
Iron Strategic Income Institut IFUNX 10/10/2006 394 0.26%
PIMCO Unconstrained Tax Manage PUTIX 1/30/2009 381 0.25%
AllianceBern Unconstrained Bon AGLIX 3/1/2005 377 0.24%
Putnam Absolute Return 100 Y PARYX 12/23/2008 282 0.18%
American Beacon Flexible Bond AFXIX 7/5/2011 247 0.16%
Eaton Vance Multi-Strat Absolu EIDDX 10/1/2009 227 0.15%
Metropolitan West Strategic In MWSIX 3/31/2004 202 0.13%
MFS® Absolute Return I MRNIX 3/30/2011 200 0.13%
Forward Credit Analysis Long/S FLSIX 5/1/2008 123 0.08%
Hartford Unconstrained Bond R5 HTITX 9/30/2011 113 0.07%
UBS Fixed Income Opportunities FNOYX 11/29/2010 64 0.04%
Parametric Absolute Return Ins EOAIX 9/30/2010 39 0.03%
Harbor Unconstrained Bond Admi HRUBX 4/1/2010 38 0.02%
Federated Unconstrained Bond I FUBDX 12/13/2010 18 0.01%
Number of Funds 40
Total Index Assets 145416
Total Strategy Assets 153985
Sample Percentage 94.44%
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Multi – Alternative 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of Funds 46
Total Index Assets 21061
Total Strategy Assets 40014
Sample Percentage 52.63%
Fund Name Ticker Inception Date Total Assets Segment Weight
Natixis ASG Global Alternative GAFYX 9/30/2008 2857 13.57%
Absolute Strategies I ASFIX 7/11/2005 2006 9.52%
Goldman Sachs Abs Return Track GJRTX 5/30/2008 1961 9.31%
AQR Multi-Strategy Alternative ASAIX 7/19/2011 1436 6.82%
JHancock Alternative Asset All JAAIX 12/30/2010 1290 6.13%
Vantagepoint Diversifying Stra VPDAX 10/30/2007 1046 4.97%
Litman Gregory Master Alt Stra MASFX 9/30/2011 913 4.34%
Oppenheimer Flexible Strategie QOPYX 12/16/1996 805 3.82%
SEI Muti-Asset Real Return A ( SEIAX 7/29/2011 709 3.37%
PACE Alternative Strategies P PASPX 4/11/2006 699 3.32%
Hatteras Alpha Hedged Strategi ALPIX 9/30/2011 633 3.01%
Deutsche Alternative Asset All AAAZX 7/30/2007 564 2.68%
Deutsche Select Alternative Al SELIX 9/30/2008 550 2.61%
ASTON/Lake Partners LASSO Alte ALSOX 4/1/2009 512 2.43%
Dreyfus Dynamic Total Return I AVGRX 5/2/2006 509 2.42%
SEI Multi Strategy Alternative SMSAX 4/1/2010 492 2.34%
Transamerica Multi-Manager Alt TASIX 11/30/2009 487 2.31%
MFS® Global Alternative Strate DVRKX 12/20/2007 383 1.82%
Dreyfus Global Real Return I DRRIX 5/12/2010 370 1.76%
Hatteras Hedged Strategies Ins HHSIX 5/2/2011 352 1.67%
UBS Dynamic Alpha P BNAYX 1/27/2005 322 1.53%
Palmer Square Absolute Return PSQIX 5/17/2011 310 1.47%
Dunham Monthly Distribution N DNMDX 9/29/2008 278 1.32%
IQ Alpha Hedge Strategy Inst IQHIX 6/30/2008 225 1.07%
Virtus Alternatives Diversifie VADIX 10/1/2009 123 0.58%
Guggenheim Multi-Hedge Strateg RYIMX 5/3/2010 104 0.49%
Columbia Absolute Ret Enh Mult CASIX 3/31/2011 101 0.48%
Aberdeen Diversified Alternati GASIX 6/29/2004 98 0.47%
Nuveen Tactical Market Opportu FGTYX 12/30/2009 95 0.45%
Ramius Hedged Alpha I RDRIX 7/22/2010 94 0.45%
KCM Macro Trends R-1 KCMTX 8/4/2008 88 0.42%
Permal Alternative Core I LPTIX 4/13/2009 86 0.41%
Absolute Credit Opportunities AOFOX 10/21/2008 74 0.35%
AMG FQ Global Alternatives Ins MGAIX 1/1/2010 70 0.33%
SunAmerica Alternative Strateg SUNWX 11/4/2008 65 0.31%
Alpha Opportunistic Alternativ ACOPX 1/31/2011 65 0.31%
Compass EMP Alternative Strate CAIAX 12/30/2009 59 0.28%
Granite Harbor Tactical Invest GHTFX 9/8/2011 46 0.22%
EAS Crow Point Alternatives I EASIX 8/14/2008 38 0.18%
Alpha Defensive Alternatives I ACDEX 1/31/2011 36 0.17%
GMG Defensive Beta MPDAX 8/14/2009 28 0.13%
Van Eck Multi-Manager Alternat VMAIX 6/5/2009 25 0.12%
Columbia Absolute Ret Multi-St CMSIX 3/31/2011 22 0.10%
Guggenheim Event Drv & Distrsd RYDTX 6/30/2010 12 0.06%
FundX Tactical Total Return TOTLX 5/29/2009 12 0.06%
JPMorgan Alternative Strategie JARSX 7/1/2010 11 0.05%
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Appendix III – Alternative Investment Strategy Descriptions[9, 59] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund Hedge Fund
Nontraditional Bond
The Nontraditional Bond category contains funds that pursue 
strategies divergent in one or more ways from conventional practice 
in the broader bond-fund universe. Many funds in this group describe 
themselves as "absolute return" portfolios, which seek to avoid losses 
and produce returns uncorrelated with the overall bond market; they 
employ a variety of methods to achieve those aims. Another large 
subset are self-described "unconstrained" portfolios that have more 
flexibility to invest tactically across a wide swath of individual 
sectors, including high-yield and foreign debt, and typically with very 
large allocations. The category is also home to a subset of portfolios 
that attempt to minimize volatility by maintaining short or ultra-short 
duration portfolios, but explicitly court significant credit and foreign 
bond market risk in order to generate high returns. Funds within this 
category often will use credit default swaps and other fixed income 
derivatives to a significant level within their portfolios.
HFRX Fixed Income - Credit Index includes strategies with exposure to 
credit across a broad continuum of credit sub-strategies, including 
Corporate, Sovereign,Distressed, Convertible, Asset Backed, Capital 
Structure Arbitrage, Multi-Strategy and other Relative Value and Event 
Driven sub-strategies. Investment thesis across all strategies is 
predicated on realization of a valuation discrepancy between the related 
credit instruments. Strategies may also include and utilize equity 
securities, credit derivatives, government fixed income, commodities, 
currencies or other hybrid securities.
Long/Short Equity
Long-short portfolios hold sizable stakes in both long and short 
positions in equities and related derivatives. Some funds that fall into 
this category will shift their exposure to long and short positions 
depending on their macro outlook or the opportunities they uncover 
through bottom-up research. Some funds may simply hedge long stock 
positions through exchange-traded funds or derivatives. At least 75% 
of the assets are in equity securities or derivatives.
Equity Hedge strategies maintain positions both long and short in 
primarily equity and equity derivative securities. A wide variety of 
investment processes can be employed to arrive at an investment 
decision, including both quantitative and fundamental techniques; 
strategies can be broadly diversified or narrowly focused on specific 
sectors and can range broadly in terms of levels of net exposure, 
leverage employed, holding period, concentrations of market 
capitalizations and valuation ranges of typical portfolios. Equity 
Hedgemanagers would typically maintain at least 50%, and may in some 
cases be substantially entirely invested in equities, both long and short.
Multialternative
These funds offer investors exposure to several different alternative 
investment tactics. Funds in this category have a majority of their 
assets exposed to alternative strategies. An investor’s exposure to 
different tactics may change slightly over time in response to market 
movements. Funds in this category include both funds with static 
allocations to alternative strategies and funds tactically allocating 
among alternative strategies and asset classes. The gross short 
exposure is greater than 20%.
The HFRX Absolute Return Index is designed to be representative of the 
overall composition of the hedge fund universe. It is comprised of all 
eligible hedge fund strategies; including but not limited to convertible 
arbitrage, distressed securities, equity hedge, equity market neutral, 
event driven, macro, merger arbitrage, and relative value arbitrage. As a 
component of the optimization process, the index selects constituents 
which characteristically exhibit lower volatilities and lower correlations 
to standard directional benchmarks of equity market and hedge fund 
industry performance.
Strategy Descriptions
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Managed Futures
These funds primarily trade liquid global futures, options, swaps, and 
foreign exchange contracts, both listed and over-the-counter. A majority 
of these funds follow trend-following, price-momentum strategies. Other 
strategies included in this category are systematic mean-reversion, 
discretionary global macro strategies, commodity index tracking, and 
other futures strategies. More than 60% of the fund's exposure is invested 
through derivative securities. These funds obtain exposure primarily 
through derivatives; the holdings are largely cash instruments.
Macro strategy managers trade a broad range of strategies in which the 
investment process is predicated on movements in underlying economic 
variables and the impact hese have on equity, fixed income, hard currency 
and commodity markets. Managers employ a variety of techniques, both 
discretionary and systematic analysis, combinations of top down and bottom 
up theses, quantitative and fundamental approaches and long and short term 
holding periods. Although some strategies employ RV techniques, Macro 
strategies are distinct from RV strategies in that the primary investment 
thesis is predicated on predicted or future movements in the underlying 
instruments, rather than realization of a valuation discrepancy between 
securities. In a similar way, while both Macro and equity hedge managers 
may hold equity securities, the overriding investment thesis is predicated on 
the impact movements in underlying macroeconomic variables may have on 
security prices, as opposed to EH, in which the fundamental characteristics on 
the company are the most significant and integral to investment thesis.
Market Neutral
These funds attempt to reduce systematic risk created by factors such as 
exposures to sectors, market-cap ranges, investment styles, currencies, 
and/or countries. They try to achieve this by matching short positions 
within each area against long positions. These strategies are often 
managed as beta-neutral, dollar-neutral, or sector-neutral. In attempting 
to reduce systematic risk, these funds put the emphasis on issue 
selection, with profits dependent on their ability to sell short and buy 
long the correct securities.
Equity Market Neutral strategies employ sophisticated quantitative 
techniques of analyzing price data to ascertain information about future price 
movement and relationships between securities, select securities for 
purchase and sale. These can include both Factor-based and Statistical 
Arbitrage/Trading strategies. Factor-based investment strategies include 
strategies in which the investment thesis is predicated on the systematic 
analysis of common relationships between securities. In many but not all 
cases, portfolios are constructed to be neutral to one or multiple variables, 
such as broader equity markets in dollar or beta terms, and leverage is 
frequently employed to enhance the return profile of the positions 
identified. Statistical Arbitrage/Trading strategies consist of strategies in 
which the investment thesis is predicated on exploiting pricing anomalies 
which may occur as a function of expected mean reversion inherent in 
security prices; high frequency techniques may be employed and trading 
strategies may also be employed on the basis on technical analysis or 
opportunistically to exploit new information the investment manager 
believes has not been fully, completely or accurately discounted into current 
security prices. 
Multi-Currency
Currency portfolios invest in multiple currencies through the use of short-
term money market instruments; derivative instruments including and 
not limited to forward currency contracts, index swaps, and options; and 
cash deposits.
Currency Index include both discretionary and systematic currency strategies. 
Systematic Currency strategies have investment processes typically as 
function of mathematical, algorithmic and technical models, with little or no 
influence of individuals over the portfolio positioning. Strategies which 
employ an investment process  designed to identify opportunities in markets 
exhibiting trending or momentum characteristics across currency assets 
classes, frequently with related ancillary exposure n sovereign fixed income. 
Strategies typically employ quantitative process which focus on statistically 
robust or technical patterns in the return series of the asset, and typically 
focus on highly liquid instruments and maintain shorter holding periods than 
either discretionary or mean reverting strategies. Although some strategies 
seek to employ counter trend models, strategies benefit most from an 
environment characterized by persistent, discernible trending behavior. 
Systematic Currency strategies typically would expect to have greater than 
35% of portfolio in dedicated currency exposure over a given market cycle. 
Discretionary Currency strategies are reliant on the fundamental evaluation 
of market data, relationships and influences as they pertain primarily to 
currency markets including positions in global foreign exchange markets, 
both listed and unlisted, and as interpreted by an individual or group of 
individuals who make decisions on portfolio positions; strategies employ an 
investment process most heavily influenced by top down analysis of 
macroeconomic variables.
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Appendix IV – Statistical Tests 
Currencies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hedge Funds Mutual Funds
Mean 0.0010796 -9.25999E-05
Variance 4.67125E-05 0.000204821
Observations 36 36
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 50
t Stat 0.443460326
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.32967293
t Critical one-tail 1.675905025
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.659345861
t Critical two-tail 2.008559112
Multi-Currency Comparison Results
F Value DF 1 DF 2 P Value
0.438436 2 68 0.064686
Chow Test
Mutual Funds Hedge Funds
Mean -9.25999E-05 0.0010796
Variance 0.000204821 4.67125E-05
Observations 36 36
df 35 35
F 4.384720008
P(F<=f) one-tail 1.54973E-05
F Critical one-tail 1.757139526
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances
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Managed Futures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hedge Funds Mutual Funds
Mean 0.0001148 0.001913564
Variance 5.16587E-05 0.000328446
Observations 36 36
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 46
t Stat -0.553571767
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.291276422
t Critical one-tail 1.678660414
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.582552845
t Critical two-tail 2.012895599
Managed Futures Comparison Results
Mutual Fund Hedge Fund
Mean 0.001913564 0.0001148
Variance 0.000328446 5.16587E-05
Observations 36 36
df 35 35
F 6.357996887
P(F<=f) one-tail 1.62642E-07
F Critical one-tail 1.757139526
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances
F Value DF 1 DF 2 P Value
0.084107 2 68 0.91928
Chow Test
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Market Neutral  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hedge Funds Mutual Funds
Mean 0.000180638 -0.000726454
Variance 5.94996E-05 4.46281E-05
Observations 36 36
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 69
t Stat 0.533359059
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.297749477
t Critical one-tail 1.667238549
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.595498955
t Critical two-tail 1.994945415
Market Neutral Comparison Results
Mutual Funds Hedge Funds
Mean 0.000180638 -0.000726454
Variance 5.94996E-05 4.46281E-05
Observations 36 36
df 35 35
F 1.333230567
P(F<=f) one-tail 0.199543104
F Critical one-tail 1.757139526
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances
F Value DF 1 DF 2 P Value
0.691167 2 68 0.504476
Chow Test
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Long / Short Equity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F Value DF 1 DF 2 P Value
0.208207 2 68 0.812555
Chow Test
Hedge Funds Mutual Funds
Mean 0.004024929 0.005247741
Variance 0.000187396 0.000196147
Observations 36 36
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 70
t Stat -0.374631455
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.354533574
t Critical one-tail 1.666914479
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.709067148
t Critical two-tail 1.994437112
Long/Short Equity Comparison Results
Mutual Funds Hedge Funds
Mean 0.005247741 0.004024929
Variance 0.000196147 0.000187396
Observations 36 36
df 35 35
F 1.046695526
P(F<=f) one-tail 0.446688325
F Critical one-tail 1.757139526
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances
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Non-Traditional Bond  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hedge Funds Mutual Funds
Mean 0.003715381 0.001028575
Variance 7.56922E-05 3.23214E-05
Observations 36 36
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 60
t Stat 1.551131212
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.063064694
t Critical one-tail 1.670648865
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.126129388
t Critical two-tail 2.000297822
Nontraditional Bond Comparison Results
Hedge Funds Mutual Funds
Mean 0.003715381 0.001028575
Variance 7.56922E-05 3.23214E-05
Observations 36 36
df 35 35
F 2.34185996
P(F<=f) one-tail 0.006884396
F Critical one-tail 1.757139526
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances
F Value DF 1 DF 2 P Value
13.73465 2 68 9.77E-06
Chow Test
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Multi-Alternative  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hedge Funds Mutual Funds
Mean 0.001421193 0.001674564
Variance 1.99915E-05 0.000101577
Observations 36 36
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 48
t Stat -0.137879079
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.445456383
t Critical one-tail 1.677224196
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.890912767
t Critical two-tail 2.010634758
Multi-Alternative Comparison Results
Mutual Fund Hedge Fund
Mean 0.001674564 0.001421193
Variance 0.000101577 1.99915E-05
Observations 36 36
df 35 35
F 5.08100054
P(F<=f) one-tail 2.73318E-06
F Critical one-tail 1.757139526
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances
F Value DF 1 DF 2 P Value
0.613592 2 68 0.544385
Chow Test
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